Universität Wien
Achtung! Das Lehrangebot ist noch nicht vollständig und wird bis Semesterbeginn laufend ergänzt.

040172 UK Applied Economentrics: Empirical Industrial Organization and Strategic Interaction (BA) (2016S)

8.00 ECTS (4.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
Moodle

An/Abmeldung

Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").

Details

max. 50 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch

Lehrende

Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert

  • Dienstag 01.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Montag 07.03. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 08.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Montag 14.03. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 15.03. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Montag 04.04. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 05.04. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Montag 11.04. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 12.04. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Montag 18.04. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 19.04. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Montag 25.04. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 26.04. 11:30 - 13:00 PC-Seminarraum 5 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Untergeschoß
  • Montag 02.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 03.05. 11:30 - 13:00 PC-Seminarraum 5 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Untergeschoß
  • Montag 09.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 10.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Montag 23.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 24.05. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Montag 30.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 31.05. 11:30 - 13:00 PC-Seminarraum 5 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Untergeschoß
  • Montag 06.06. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 07.06. 11:30 - 13:00 PC-Seminarraum 5 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Untergeschoß
  • Montag 13.06. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 14.06. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Montag 20.06. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 21.06. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Montag 27.06. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 8 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Dienstag 28.06. 11:30 - 13:00 Hörsaal 9 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock

Information

Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung

In this course we will study how game-theoretic models can be taken to (mostly) non-
experimental data. Applications include the identification of conduct (competition and
collusion), auctions, market entry models, and sports. The emphasis will be on recent
empirical papers. We will review basic concepts early in the course, but students
are expected to be familiar with basic game-theoretic concepts and econometric tools
(e.g. Instrumental Variables, Maximum-Likelihood Estimation).

Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel

We will first review basic game theory and econometrics. There will be two early quizzes on the review material to make sure everybody has the necessary tools to follow the course material. Then students will carry out small empirical projects which have to be written up in groups. Finally, students will have to present a recent empirical paper related to the course content and write a report on it.
Grading: Quizzes: 30%, Empirical Projects 35%, Presentation and Report 35%

Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab

This is a course for advanced bachelor students in economics, who have already taken courses in microeconomics, game theory, and econometrics.

Prüfungsstoff

Literatur

Price and Quantity Setting in Imperfectly Competitive Markets
-Timothy F Bresnahan. Empirical studies of industries with market power. Handbook
of industrial organization, 2:1011-1057, 1989
-Timothy F Bresnahan. The oligopoly solution concept is identified. Economics
Letters, 10(1):87-92, 1982

Competition and Collusion
-Timothy F. Bresnahan. Competition and collusion in the american automobile
industry: The 1955 price war. Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4):457-482,
1987
- Robert H Porter. A study of cartel stability: The joint executive committee, 1880-
1886. The Bell Journal of Economics, pages 301-314, 1983
Entry
- Timothy F Bresnahan and Peter C Reiss. Entry and competition in concentrated
markets. Journal of Political Economy, pages 977-1009, 1991
- Steven T Berry. Estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 889-917, 1992
- Katja Seim. An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type
choices. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3):619-640, 2006
Empirical Models of Auctions
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, Herve Ossard, and Quang Vuong. Econometrics of first-price
auctions. Econometrica, pages 953-980, 1995
- Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. Optimal nonparametric
estimation of first-price auctions. Econometrica, 68(3):525-574, 2000
- Patrick Bajari and Ali Horta¸csu. Economic insights from internet auctions. Journal
of Economic Literature, 42(2):457-486, 2004
- Patrick Bajari and Ali Hortacsu. The winner’s curse, reserve prices, and endoge-
nous entry: empirical insights from ebay auctions. RAND Journal of Economics,
pages 329-355, 2003
Collusion in Auctions
- Robert H Porter and J Douglas Zona. Detection of bid rigging in procurement
auctions. Journal of Political Economy, 101(3):518-38, 1993
- Patrick Bajari and Lixin Ye. Deciding between competition and collusion. Review
of Economics and Statistics, 85(4):971-989, 2003
- Martin Pesendorfer. A study of collusion in first-price auctions. The Review of
Economic Studies, 67(3):381-411, 2000
Sports
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta. Beautiful Game Theory: How Soccer Can Help Economics
. Princeton University Press, 2014
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta. Professionals play minimax. The Review of Economic
Studies, 70(2):395-415, 2003
- P-A Chiappori, Steven Levitt, and Timothy Groseclose. Testing mixed-strategy
equilibria when players are heterogeneous: the case of penalty kicks in soccer.
American Economic Review, pages 1138-1151, 2002

Useful books for background reading:

-J. Church and R. Ware, Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach, McGraw Hill, 2000,
This book is now available online and can be downloaded for free at http://homepages.ucalgary.ca/~jrchurch/page4/page4.html
-R. Gibbons, A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
-J. Tirole: Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1989
-P. Davis and E. Garcés, Quantitative techniques for competition and antitrust analysis, Princeton University Press, 2009.
-P. Belleflamme and M. Peitz, Industrial organization: markets and strategies, Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:28