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040383 UK Game Theory and Industrial Organization (MA) (2017W)
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
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This course provides an introduction to basic concepts of Game Theory and applies these concepts to topics in Industrial Organization. Roughly speaking, Industrial Organization analyses both the functioning of markets and firms' behavior in markets.Contents:
1. Static games with complete information and the Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Cournot model)
2. Sequential games with complete information and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Stackelberg model)
3. Static games with incomplete information and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Typical application: Auctions)
4. Sequential games with incomplete information and the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Signalling model).
1. Static games with complete information and the Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Cournot model)
2. Sequential games with complete information and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Stackelberg model)
3. Static games with incomplete information and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Typical application: Auctions)
4. Sequential games with incomplete information and the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (Typical application: Signalling model).
An/Abmeldung
Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").
- Anmeldung von Fr 08.09.2017 09:00 bis Do 21.09.2017 12:00
- Anmeldung von Do 28.09.2017 11:30 bis Di 03.10.2017 23:59
- Abmeldung bis Sa 14.10.2017 23:59
Details
max. 50 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch
Lehrende
Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert
- Dienstag 03.10. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 10.10. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 17.10. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 24.10. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 31.10. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 07.11. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 14.11. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 21.11. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 28.11. 09:45 - 11:15 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 05.12. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 12.12. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 09.01. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 16.01. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 23.01. 09:45 - 13:00 Seminarraum 16 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 3.Stock
- Dienstag 30.01. 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 7 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
Information
Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung
Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel
Midterm Exam (45%), Final Exam (45%), Homework Assignments (10%). Details will be provided during the first class meeting.
Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab
Prüfungsstoff
Literatur
Course textbooks:
- Gibbons, Robert (1992), A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf (Prentice Hall).
- Osborne, Martin J. (2004), An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.
- Church, Jeffrey and Roger Ware (2000), Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach, McGraw-Hill.
- Gibbons, Robert (1992), A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf (Prentice Hall).
- Osborne, Martin J. (2004), An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.
- Church, Jeffrey and Roger Ware (2000), Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach, McGraw-Hill.
Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis
Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:29
and applies these concepts to topics in Industrial Organization. Roughly speaking, Industrial
Organization analyses both the functioning of markets and firms' behavior in markets.Specific Contents of this Course:
* Static games with complete information and the Nash equilibrium. (Typical application:
Cournot model)
* Sequential games with complete information and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
(Typical application: Stackelberg model)
* Static games with incomplete information and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Typical application: Auctions)
* Sequential games with incomplete information and the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
(Typical application: Signalling model).