Achtung! Das Lehrangebot ist noch nicht vollständig und wird bis Semesterbeginn laufend ergänzt.
040827 UK PhD-VGSE: Information Economics (2014W)
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung
Labels
Start: October 8, 2014
Wednesday, 11.30 - 13.00h, Seminarroom No. 03.307, 3rd floor, VGSE
Master Students that want to attend this please contact Karl Schlag via email.Masterstudents: Master students are accepted if they have already passed the master game theory class, applicants should write the instructor.(karl.schlag@univie.ac.at).Please indicate should you also plan to attend course no. 040048 Consumption, Production and Welfare A.VGSE-Students: for registration, please send an email to verena.konrad@univie.ac.atPhD-Students (Non-VGSE): The level of this course requires knowledge of advanced macroeconomics, advanced microeconomics, and advanced econometrics. Students may apply for this course by sending an email to info@vgse.at including their CV, transcript (Sammelzeugnis) and optionally a recommendation of their thesis advisor. More information at www.vgse.at.
Wednesday, 11.30 - 13.00h, Seminarroom No. 03.307, 3rd floor, VGSE
Master Students that want to attend this please contact Karl Schlag via email.Masterstudents: Master students are accepted if they have already passed the master game theory class, applicants should write the instructor.(karl.schlag@univie.ac.at).Please indicate should you also plan to attend course no. 040048 Consumption, Production and Welfare A.VGSE-Students: for registration, please send an email to verena.konrad@univie.ac.atPhD-Students (Non-VGSE): The level of this course requires knowledge of advanced macroeconomics, advanced microeconomics, and advanced econometrics. Students may apply for this course by sending an email to info@vgse.at including their CV, transcript (Sammelzeugnis) and optionally a recommendation of their thesis advisor. More information at www.vgse.at.
An/Abmeldung
Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").
- Anmeldung von Mo 15.09.2014 09:00 bis Mi 24.09.2014 14:00
- Abmeldung bis Di 14.10.2014 23:59
Details
max. 20 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch
Lehrende
Termine
Zur Zeit sind keine Termine bekannt.
Information
Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung
Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel
The course consists of 2 lecture hours per week. There will be a midterm (45%), a final exam
(45%) and some homework assignments (10% of the grade).
(45%) and some homework assignments (10% of the grade).
Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab
Prüfungsstoff
Literatur
Reading list will include:
Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (chapters 13, 14, 23)
Botlon and Dewatripont (2004). Contract Theory, The MIT Press.
Salanie, B.( 1997) The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press.
Schlag, K.H. and Vida, P (2014), Commitments, Intentions, Truth and Nash Equilibria, working paper.
Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (chapters 13, 14, 23)
Botlon and Dewatripont (2004). Contract Theory, The MIT Press.
Salanie, B.( 1997) The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press.
Schlag, K.H. and Vida, P (2014), Commitments, Intentions, Truth and Nash Equilibria, working paper.
Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis
Letzte Änderung: Mo 07.09.2020 15:29
This course belongs to the general area of Microeconomics. Particular attention will be put on modeling and solving models that involve asymmetric information. An important solution tool will be Game Theory. Master students are accepted upon individual basis, I will accept any master student who has passed our master game theory class. Buzz words will be perfect Bayesian equilibrium, pooling and separating equilibrium, incentive compatibility and individual rationality.Overview:
In this course we will investigate how information, in particular how differences in information between economic agents, influences economic decisions and outcomes. An important part of the course will consist of modeling and then solving Microeconomic models that involve asymmetric information. Note that it is not always good to receive more information in strategic situations. Topics include moral hazard, signaling and adverse selection. Examples will include the hold up problem surrounding relation specific investments, the role of education as signaling device in the job market, the market for used cars and strategic behavior in auctions.