Universität Wien
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180122 SE Epistemic paternalism and epistemic autonomy (2024S)

5.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 18 - Philosophie
Prüfungsimmanente Lehrveranstaltung

Hinweis der SPL Philosophie:

Das Abgeben von ganz oder teilweise von einem KI-tool (z.B. ChatGPT) verfassten Texten als Leistungsnachweis (z.B. Seminararbeit) ist nur dann erlaubt, wenn dies von der Lehrveranstaltungsleitung ausdrücklich als mögliche Arbeitsweise genehmigt wurde. Auch hierbei müssen direkt oder indirekt zitierte Textstellen wie immer klar mit Quellenangabe ausgewiesen werden.

Die Lehrveranstaltungsleitung kann zur Überprüfung der Autorenschaft einer abgegebenen schriftlichen Arbeit ein notenrelevantes Gespräch (Plausibilitätsprüfung) vorsehen, das erfolgreich zu absolvieren ist.
Moodle

An/Abmeldung

Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").

Details

max. 30 Teilnehmer*innen
Sprache: Englisch

Lehrende

Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert

  • Freitag 15.03. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 22.03. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 12.04. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 19.04. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 26.04. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 03.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 10.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 17.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 24.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 31.05. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 07.06. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 14.06. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 21.06. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien
  • Freitag 28.06. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 2G, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. II/2.Stock, 1010 Wien

Information

Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung

Epistemic paternalism means non-consultatively interfering with someone’s inquiry or belief-formation for their own epistemic good. For example, it would arguably be paternalistic to suppress information about extremely rare yet serious side-effects of vaccines (to prevent the false belief that one should not get vaccinated), or about crimes committed by refugees (to prevent the false belief that these cases indicate a broader pattern). A certain amount of epistemic paternalism seems to be a natural and welcome part of our lives. Journalists, teachers and all others in the business of informing or advising need to decide what to cover and how; it is only desirable that they do this with the audience’s epistemic interests in mind. On the other hand, it is also plausible that epistemic paternalism can go too far and become a threat to epistemic autonomy—people’s ability to exercise rational control over their own beliefs. The threat to autonomy is often associated with nudges (non-coercive interventions) that “bypass rationality”—for example, announcing the portion of vaccinated people who did not experience serious side effects rather than the portion who did. It is unclear, however, which interventions into the available information and its presentation bypass rationality and thereby threaten autonomy. Further, perhaps epistemic paternalism can threaten epistemic autonomy even when rationality is not bypassed—for example, when information that one would presumably be interested in is simply not mentioned, in order to prevent wrong conclusions being drawn.
In this course, we will read and discuss recent work on epistemic paternalism, with a focus on whether and how epistemically paternalistic practices threaten epistemic autonomy.

Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel

The students are expected to (1) attend the seminars (missing up to four classes is allowed; it is not possible to make up for missing more than four classes), having read the relevant text in advance and contributing actively to the discussion; (2) provide short reading responses ("a question to the author") by the day before the seminar; (3) submit a draft of the final essay and the final essay (the possible topics will be provided; length: 1500—2000 words).
Using ChatGPT or similar AI tools is not allowed. If there are doubts about authorship, the students may be invited to a discussion on their essay.

Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab

In order to get a passing grade, the students must at least (1) attend the seminars (missing up to four classes is allowed; it is not possible to make up for missing more than four classes); and (2) submit a draft of the final essay and the final essay and get a passing grade on both (at least "4").

The final grade is the weighted average of the grades for the following tasks (each graded on the scale of 1—5, where 1 is "very good" and 5 is "unsatisfactory"):
(1) Seminar participation and weekly reading responses (30%): based on the regularity, timeliness and helpfulness of the oral and written contributions.
(2) Draft of final essay (20%): based on clarity and cogency of the argumentation, structure, readability, engagement with the course texts (demonstrating understanding).
(3) Final essay (50%): based on clarity and cogency of the argumentation, structure, readability, engagement with the course texts (demonstrating understanding), using feedback.

Prüfungsstoff

Literatur

Preliminary list (see the final readings in Moodle):
Goldman, Alvin I. 1991. “Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and Society”. Journal of Philosophy. 88(3), 113–131.
Jackson, Elizabeth. 2022. “What’s Epistemic about Epistemic Paternalism?” In J. Matheson, K. Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy, Routledge, 132–150.
Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer. 2018. “Epistemic Paternalism.” In: Kalle Grill, Jason Hanna (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism, Routledge, 261–274.
Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer. 2013. “On the Viability of Epistemic Paternalism: Epistemic Autonomy”. In: Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence, Palgrave Macmillan, 92–112.
Medvecky, Fabien. 2020. “Epistemic Paternalism, Science, and Communication“. In: Guy Axtell, Amiel Bernal (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications, Rowman & Littlefield, 79–90.
Bullock, Emma C. 2018. “Knowing and Not-knowing For Your Own Good: The Limits of Epistemic Paternalism”. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 35 (2), 433–447.
Croce, Michel. 2020. “Epistemic Paternalism, Personal Sovereignty, and One’s Own Good”. In: Guy Axtell, Amiel Bernal (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Rowman & Littlefield, 155–168.
Meehan, Daniella. 2020. “Epistemic Vice and Epistemic Nudging: A Solution?”. In: Guy Axtell & Amiel Bernal (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Rowman & Littlefield, 249–261.
Riley, Evan. 2017. “The Beneficent Nudge Program and Epistemic Injustice”. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20(3), 597–616.
McKenna, Robin. 2022. “Persuasion and Intellectual Autonomy”. In: Jonathan Matheson, Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge, 113–131.
Levy, Neil. 2019. “Nudge, Nudge, Wink, Wink: Nudging is Giving Reasons”. Ergo, 6(10), 281–302.
Simpson, Robert Mark. 2022. “Norms of Inquiry, Student-Led Learning, and Epistemic Paternalism”. In: Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge, 95–112.
Castro, Clinton, Adam Pham, and Alan Rubel. 2020. “Epistemic Paternalism Online”. In: Guy Axtell, Amiel Bernal (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Rowman & Littlefield, 29–43.

Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Letzte Änderung: Do 27.06.2024 07:46