Achtung! Das Lehrangebot ist noch nicht vollständig und wird bis Semesterbeginn laufend ergänzt.
180131 VO-L Abilities (2024S)
Labels
An/Abmeldung
Hinweis: Ihr Anmeldezeitpunkt innerhalb der Frist hat keine Auswirkungen auf die Platzvergabe (kein "first come, first served").
Details
Sprache: Englisch
Prüfungstermine
- Freitag 28.06.2024 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 11.10.2024 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 3D, NIG Universitätsstraße 7/Stg. III/3. Stock, 1010 Wien
- Freitag 08.11.2024 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 6 Franz König Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 9 Hof 5
- Freitag 06.12.2024 09:45 - 11:15 Hörsaal 6 Franz König Hauptgebäude, Tiefparterre Stiege 9 Hof 5
Lehrende
Termine (iCal) - nächster Termin ist mit N markiert
- Freitag 15.03. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 22.03. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 12.04. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 19.04. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 26.04. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 03.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 10.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 17.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 24.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 31.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 07.06. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 14.06. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
- Freitag 21.06. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
Information
Ziele, Inhalte und Methode der Lehrveranstaltung
Abilities are an important subject in metaphysics and in the debate in ethics surrounding free will and moral responsibility. In this course, we delve deep into the contemporary debate on abilities. What exactly are abilities? How is determinism relevant for our understanding of abilities? Do we have the ability to choose/do otherwise? What is the significance of this for moral responsibility? We will focus on various accounts of abilities: conditional analysis, possible world views, new dispositionalism; potentiality-views; two-way-power-views; success-views.By the end of this course, the student should: (1) have a thorough understanding of different theories of abilities and their weaknesses and strengths; (2) be able to explain the significance of determinism and the free will debate for our understanding of abilities (and vice versa); and (3) be able to explain the relevance of abilities for questions in ethics.The course will involve weekly lectures in person (not hybrid). The language of instruction is English. Students are expected to read the literature before the lecture. Powerpoint slides will be made available throughout the semester.
Art der Leistungskontrolle und erlaubte Hilfsmittel
There will be an in-person written exam. The exam will consist of 8 multiple choice questions and 3 essay questions to be chosen out of a possible 7 questions.
Mindestanforderungen und Beurteilungsmaßstab
The total possible points to be obtained at the exam is 100. The distribution of grades is as follows:1: 87-100 points
2: 75-86 points
3: 63-74 points
4: 50-62 points
5: 0-49 points
2: 75-86 points
3: 63-74 points
4: 50-62 points
5: 0-49 points
Prüfungsstoff
All material covered in lectures and accompanying readings.
Literatur
Preliminary reading list (might still change!):Beebee, H., Whittle, A., and Svedberg, M, 2020. “Nihil Obstat: Lewis’s Compatibilist Account of Abilities,” The Monist, 103: 245–261.
Clarke, . 2009. “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism,” Mind, 118: 323–351.
Fara, M. 2008. “Masked Abilities and Compatibilism,” Mind, 117: 843–865.
Fischer, J. M. 1999. “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility”. Ethics, 110(1): 93–139.
Frankfurt, H. 1969. ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy, 66/3: 829‐39.
Jaster, R. 2021. The Ability to do Otherwise and the New Dispositionalism. Inquiry, 65: 1149-1166.
Kenny, A. 1975. Will, Freedom, and Power, Oxford: Blackwell. (Selection)
Kratzer, A. 1977. “What ‘Must’ and ‘Can’ Must and Can Mean,” Linguistics and Philosophy, 1: 337–355.
Lehrer, K. 1968. “Cans without Ifs,” Analysis, 29: 29–32.
Lewis, D. 2020. “Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability,” The Monist, 103: 241–24.
Moore, G. E. 1912. Ethics. London: Humphrey Milford; OUP. (Selection)
Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson (Selection)
Stanley, J. and T. Williamson. 2001. “Knowing How,” The Journal of Philosophy, 97: 411–444.
Steward, H. 2020. “Agency as a Two-Way Power: A Defence,” The Monist, 103: 342–355.
van Inwagen, P. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Selection)
Vetter, B. 2013. ‘Can’ without Possible Worlds: Semantics for Anti-Humeans. Philosopher’s Imprint, 13(16): 1-27.
Vetter, B. 2017. Are abilities dispositions? Synthese, 196(1): 201-220.
Vihvelin, K. 2004. ‘Free will demystified: A dispositional account’, Philosophical Topics, 32/1: 427–450.
Whittle, A. 2010. “Dispositional Abilities,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 10(12): 1-23.
Clarke, . 2009. “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism,” Mind, 118: 323–351.
Fara, M. 2008. “Masked Abilities and Compatibilism,” Mind, 117: 843–865.
Fischer, J. M. 1999. “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility”. Ethics, 110(1): 93–139.
Frankfurt, H. 1969. ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy, 66/3: 829‐39.
Jaster, R. 2021. The Ability to do Otherwise and the New Dispositionalism. Inquiry, 65: 1149-1166.
Kenny, A. 1975. Will, Freedom, and Power, Oxford: Blackwell. (Selection)
Kratzer, A. 1977. “What ‘Must’ and ‘Can’ Must and Can Mean,” Linguistics and Philosophy, 1: 337–355.
Lehrer, K. 1968. “Cans without Ifs,” Analysis, 29: 29–32.
Lewis, D. 2020. “Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability,” The Monist, 103: 241–24.
Moore, G. E. 1912. Ethics. London: Humphrey Milford; OUP. (Selection)
Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson (Selection)
Stanley, J. and T. Williamson. 2001. “Knowing How,” The Journal of Philosophy, 97: 411–444.
Steward, H. 2020. “Agency as a Two-Way Power: A Defence,” The Monist, 103: 342–355.
van Inwagen, P. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Selection)
Vetter, B. 2013. ‘Can’ without Possible Worlds: Semantics for Anti-Humeans. Philosopher’s Imprint, 13(16): 1-27.
Vetter, B. 2017. Are abilities dispositions? Synthese, 196(1): 201-220.
Vihvelin, K. 2004. ‘Free will demystified: A dispositional account’, Philosophical Topics, 32/1: 427–450.
Whittle, A. 2010. “Dispositional Abilities,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 10(12): 1-23.
Zuordnung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis
Letzte Änderung: Mi 28.08.2024 17:26