Universität Wien
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040016 UK Bargaining and Coalition Formation: Theory and Experiments (2012W)

4.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Continuous assessment of course work

Bargaining governs the size and distribution of surplus in a number of economic environments, for example wage negotiations and trading in many markets. When bargaining takes place with more than two actors, such as in multilateral trade or international climate change agreements, coalitions typically form and are crucial in determining outcomes. Bargaining and coalition formation also take place in a variety of other political and social contexts, and the ubiquity of these processes make them an important area of study.

This course will present the main theoretical models of bargaining and coalition formation, as well as some of the key results from experimental (and possibly some empirical) studies.

Registration/Deregistration

Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).

Details

max. 50 participants
Language: English

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

  • Tuesday 02.10. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 09.10. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 16.10. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 23.10. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 30.10. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 06.11. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 13.11. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 20.11. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 27.11. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 04.12. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 11.12. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 18.12. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 08.01. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 15.01. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 22.01. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5
  • Tuesday 29.01. 16:15 - 17:45 Hörsaal 16 Hauptgebäude, Hochparterre, Stiege 5

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

Course Outline (Preliminary: see http://homepage.univie.ac.at/James.Tremewan/ for updates)
The Nash Bargaining Solution
Rubinstein’s Alternating Offer Bargaining Model
Bargaining Power in Marriage
Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Fairness Concerns
Culture and Bargaining
Biology and Bargaining
Focal Points in Bargaining
Bargaining in Legislatures
Cooperative Approaches to Coalition Formation
Experiments in Coalition Formation

Assessment and permitted materials

Assessment will be based on two tests in class time (45% each) and participation requirements (10%).

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

Examination topics

Reading list

Suggested ((Preliminary: see http://homepage.univie.ac.at/James.Tremewan/ for updates)
Thomas Schelling (1960), “The Strategy of Conflict”

Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), “Bargaining and Markets” (available for free download from http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/books.html )

Roth et al., “Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study” The American Economic Review , Vol. 81, No. 5 (Dec., 1991), pp. 1068-1095

Fehr and Schmidt, “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1999) 114 (3): 817-868

Henrich et al. “In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies” The American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 2001), pp.73-78

Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, “Microeconomic Theory” (chapter on Cooperative Game Theory)

David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn, “Bargaining in Legislatures” The American Political Science Review , Vol. 83, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 1181-1206

Hideo Konishi and Debraj Ray (2003), “Coalition formation as a dynamic process” Journal of Economic Theory

Association in the course directory

Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:28