Universität Wien
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040069 UK Empirical Models of Strategic Interaction (BA) (2014W)

4.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 4 - Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Continuous assessment of course work
Moodle

Registration/Deregistration

Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).

Details

max. 50 participants
Language: English

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

  • Monday 06.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Monday 13.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Monday 20.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Monday 27.10. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Monday 03.11. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Monday 10.11. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Monday 17.11. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Monday 24.11. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Monday 01.12. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Monday 15.12. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Monday 12.01. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Thursday 15.01. 13:15 - 14:45 Seminarraum 5 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Friday 16.01. 08:00 - 09:30 Seminarraum 5 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 1.Stock
  • Monday 19.01. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock
  • Monday 26.01. 13:15 - 14:45 Hörsaal 12 Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 2.Stock

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

In this course we will study how game-theoretic models can be taken to (mostly) non-
experimental data. Applications include the identification of conduct (competition and
collusion), auctions, market entry models, and sports. The emphasis will be on recent
empirical papers. We will review basic concepts as we go along, but students
are expected to be familiar with basic game-theoretic concepts and econometric tools
(e.g. Instrumental Variables, Maximum-Likelihood Estimation).

Assessment and permitted materials

Homework Assignments (empirical exercises): 50%
Presentation and Report: 50%

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

Examination topics

Reading list

Price and Quantity Setting in Imperfectly Competitive Markets
-Timothy F Bresnahan. Empirical studies of industries with market power. Handbook
of industrial organization, 2:1011-1057, 1989
-Timothy F Bresnahan. The oligopoly solution concept is identified. Economics
Letters, 10(1):87-92, 1982

Competition and Collusion
-Timothy F. Bresnahan. Competition and collusion in the american automobile
industry: The 1955 price war. Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4):457-482,
1987
- Robert H Porter. A study of cartel stability: The joint executive committee, 1880-
1886. The Bell Journal of Economics, pages 301-314, 1983
Entry
- Timothy F Bresnahan and Peter C Reiss. Entry and competition in concentrated
markets. Journal of Political Economy, pages 977-1009, 1991
- Steven T Berry. Estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 889-917, 1992
- Katja Seim. An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type
choices. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3):619-640, 2006
Empirical Models of Auctions
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, Herve Ossard, and Quang Vuong. Econometrics of first-price
auctions. Econometrica, pages 953-980, 1995
- Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. Optimal nonparametric
estimation of first-price auctions. Econometrica, 68(3):525-574, 2000
- Patrick Bajari and Ali Horta¸csu. Economic insights from internet auctions. Journal
of Economic Literature, 42(2):457-486, 2004
- Patrick Bajari and Ali Hortacsu. The winner’s curse, reserve prices, and endoge-
nous entry: empirical insights from ebay auctions. RAND Journal of Economics,
pages 329-355, 2003
Collusion in Auctions
- Robert H Porter and J Douglas Zona. Detection of bid rigging in procurement
auctions. Journal of Political Economy, 101(3):518-38, 1993
- Patrick Bajari and Lixin Ye. Deciding between competition and collusion. Review
of Economics and Statistics, 85(4):971-989, 2003
- Martin Pesendorfer. A study of collusion in first-price auctions. The Review of
Economic Studies, 67(3):381-411, 2000
Sports
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta. Beautiful Game Theory: How Soccer Can Help Economics
. Princeton University Press, 2014
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta. Professionals play minimax. The Review of Economic
Studies, 70(2):395-415, 2003
- P-A Chiappori, Steven Levitt, and Timothy Groseclose. Testing mixed-strategy
equilibria when players are heterogeneous: the case of penalty kicks in soccer.
American Economic Review, pages 1138-1151, 2002

Association in the course directory

Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:28