040608 FK BW VM: Organization and Human Resource Mgmt. (B) (2008S)

Course Outline

Case studies emphasize the importance of innovative organizational structures of firms which that more than compensate for technological disadvantages. In order to address why firms constitute a persistent institutional arrangement in market economies, the lecture introduces the concept of informational efficiency. It then turns to identifying settings in which either the market or the internal organization constitute dominant mechanisms for implementing efficient allocations. (De-)centralization decisions in firms are thus seen to reflect rational choices. Consequently, the analytic structures used emphasize the decision-making of individual agents within the firm, e. g. the firm management.

I. Introduction

I.1. Case Study - Toyota
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992, p. 4-6.

II. Coordination 1: Prices as scarcity signals

Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992, p. 56-87.
Neus, Werner., Einführung in die Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2003 (3.Auflage), p. 25- 88.
Laux, Helmut und Felix Liermann, Grundlagen der Organisation, Berlin etc.: Springer, 1993 (2. Auflage), p. 373-417.

III. Coordination 2: Properties of Transactions, Informational Efficiency and Choice of Coordination Mechanism

Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992, p. 88- 124.
Laux, Helmut und Felix Liermann, Grundlagen der Organisation, Berlin etc.: Springer, 1993 (2. Auflage), p. 418-461.
Neus, Werner., Einführung in die Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2003 (3.Auflage), p. 89-140.

IV. Strategic Competition

Besanko, David, David Dranove and Mark Shanley, Economics of Strategy, New York etc.: Wiley, p. 253 - 350.
Schulz, Norbert, Wettbewerbspolitik, Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2003, p. 76-136, 161-179.

V. Sources of Contract Incompleteness

Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992, p. 127-132.
Jost, Peter-J. (Hrsg.), Die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie in der Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel, 2001, ch. 1.

Readings

It is strongly recommended that students prepare selected chapters from textbooks listed in the course outline above. In particular, the German textbooks those students' understanding of the lecture content whose English language skills are not so well developed.

Grading

This class is immanently relevant for examination ("dieser Kurs ist eine Lehrveranstaltung mit immanentem Prüfungscharakter"). Students can earn a maximum of 50 points on each of the two exams, the midterm and the final. To pass the course students must collect a total of 50 points or more.
Make-up exams are only available for students on sick leave (documented by immediately handing in a doctor's sickness note at the chair's office) or leaves supported by formal decision of the university, the faculty, and/or the institute.