120011 AR MA Adv. Course Ling. 1-5 (Adv. / Hist. & Descr. / Appl. & TEFL) = Adv. Course in English Ling. (225) (2010S)
Game theoretic models of language, knowledge, and communication
Continuous assessment of course work
Labels
Diese LVA gilt für das Masterstudium English Language and Linguistics nach UG2002, das Diplomstudium (UniStG) und das Lehramt UF Englisch (UniStG).
Registration/Deregistration
Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).
- Registration is open from We 10.02.2010 06:00 to We 17.02.2010 23:59
- Registration is open from Sa 20.02.2010 10:00 to Th 04.03.2010 16:00
- Deregistration possible until We 31.03.2010 23:59
Details
max. 30 participants
Language: English
Lecturers
Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N
- Wednesday 10.03. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 17.03. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 24.03. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 14.04. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 21.04. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 28.04. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 05.05. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 12.05. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 19.05. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 26.05. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 02.06. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 09.06. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 16.06. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 23.06. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
- Wednesday 30.06. 11:00 - 13:00 Raum 5 Anglistik UniCampus Hof 8 3E-O1-17
Information
Aims, contents and method of the course
Assessment and permitted materials
Evaluation is based on:
(1) participation in class and the preparation of reading assignments and problem sets,
(2) a written final exam, and
(3) a term paper, which can be a literature survey, an essay, or a small research paper where you apply some of the methods that we have seen in class to a specific problem in linguistics.
(1) participation in class and the preparation of reading assignments and problem sets,
(2) a written final exam, and
(3) a term paper, which can be a literature survey, an essay, or a small research paper where you apply some of the methods that we have seen in class to a specific problem in linguistics.
Minimum requirements and assessment criteria
This course is self contained; that is, no prior knowledge of game theory is required. What is required, however, is the willingness to follow a formal argument and to learn how to work with game theoretic methods.
Examination topics
Reading list
1. Aumann, R. 1976. Agreeing to Disagree. The Annals of Statistics 4, 1236--1239.
2. Hurford, J., 1989. Biological evolution of the Saussurean sign as a component of the language acquisition device. Lingua 77, 187--222.
3. Jäger, G. 2007. Evolutionary game theory and typology. A case study, Language 83, 74--109.
4. Jäger, G. 2008. The evolution of convex categories, Linguistics and Philosophy, 30, 551--564.
5. Brown, B., Levinson C.S. 1987. Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge University Press: New York.
6. Geanakoplos, J.D., Polemarchakis, H.M. We cann't disagree forever. Journal of Economic Theory 1982, 192--200.
7. Lewis, D., 1969. Convention: A philosophical study. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
8. Niyogi, P., 2006. The Computational Nature of Language Learning and Evolution, University of Chicago Press.
9. Nowak, M.A., Krakauer D. C., 1999. The evolution of language. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 96, 8028--8033.
10. Nowak M.A., Komarova, N.L., Niyogi, P., 2001. Evolution of universal grammar. Science 291: 114-118.
11. Nowak M.A., Komarova, N.L., Niyogi, P., 2002. Computational and evolutionary aspects of language. Nature 417, 611--617.
12. Nowak M.A., Plotkin, J.B., Jansen, V.A.A., 2000. The evolution of syntactic communication. Nature 404, 495--498.
13. Pawlowitsch, C., 2008. Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system. Games and Economic Behavior 63, 203--226.
14. Pinker, S., Nowak, M.A., Lee, J.J., 2008. The logic of indirect speech. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 105, 833--838.
15. Rubinstein, A. 1989. The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under ``almost common knowledge''. The American Economic Review 79, 385--391.
16. Rubinstein, A. 2000. Economics and Language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
2. Hurford, J., 1989. Biological evolution of the Saussurean sign as a component of the language acquisition device. Lingua 77, 187--222.
3. Jäger, G. 2007. Evolutionary game theory and typology. A case study, Language 83, 74--109.
4. Jäger, G. 2008. The evolution of convex categories, Linguistics and Philosophy, 30, 551--564.
5. Brown, B., Levinson C.S. 1987. Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge University Press: New York.
6. Geanakoplos, J.D., Polemarchakis, H.M. We cann't disagree forever. Journal of Economic Theory 1982, 192--200.
7. Lewis, D., 1969. Convention: A philosophical study. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
8. Niyogi, P., 2006. The Computational Nature of Language Learning and Evolution, University of Chicago Press.
9. Nowak, M.A., Krakauer D. C., 1999. The evolution of language. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 96, 8028--8033.
10. Nowak M.A., Komarova, N.L., Niyogi, P., 2001. Evolution of universal grammar. Science 291: 114-118.
11. Nowak M.A., Komarova, N.L., Niyogi, P., 2002. Computational and evolutionary aspects of language. Nature 417, 611--617.
12. Nowak M.A., Plotkin, J.B., Jansen, V.A.A., 2000. The evolution of syntactic communication. Nature 404, 495--498.
13. Pawlowitsch, C., 2008. Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system. Games and Economic Behavior 63, 203--226.
14. Pinker, S., Nowak, M.A., Lee, J.J., 2008. The logic of indirect speech. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 105, 833--838.
15. Rubinstein, A. 1989. The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under ``almost common knowledge''. The American Economic Review 79, 385--391.
16. Rubinstein, A. 2000. Economics and Language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Association in the course directory
Diplom 343, UF 344, MA 812
LI 12-0195, SPCode 223-225, 225, 226/228, 236/238, 721-723, M03, M04, M05
LI 12-0195, SPCode 223-225, 225, 226/228, 236/238, 721-723, M03, M04, M05
Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:33
(1) recent literature in linguistics, computer science, and mathematical biology that uses game theoretic methods to explain certain aspects of language evolution (for example, Hurford 1989, Jäger 2007, 2008, Nowak et al. 1999, 2000, 2001);
(2) models in classical game theory that investigate the role of knowledge and communication in situations of strategic interaction (for example, Aumann 1976, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 1982, Rubinstein 1989); and
(3) applications of game-theoretic methods to questions in Pragmatics like persuasion or vagueness and indirectness of speech (for example, Rubinstein 2000, or Pinker et al. 2007).