Universität Wien
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180131 VO-L Abilities (2024S)

5.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 18 - Philosophie
Moodle

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Details

Language: English

Examination dates

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

  • Friday 15.03. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
  • Friday 22.03. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
  • Friday 12.04. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
  • Friday 19.04. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
  • Friday 26.04. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
  • Friday 03.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
  • Friday 10.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
  • Friday 17.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
  • Friday 24.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
  • Friday 31.05. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
  • Friday 07.06. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
  • Friday 14.06. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock
  • Friday 21.06. 15:00 - 16:30 Hörsaal. 2H NIG 2.Stock

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

Abilities are an important subject in metaphysics and in the debate in ethics surrounding free will and moral responsibility. In this course, we delve deep into the contemporary debate on abilities. What exactly are abilities? How is determinism relevant for our understanding of abilities? Do we have the ability to choose/do otherwise? What is the significance of this for moral responsibility? We will focus on various accounts of abilities: conditional analysis, possible world views, new dispositionalism; potentiality-views; two-way-power-views; success-views.

By the end of this course, the student should: (1) have a thorough understanding of different theories of abilities and their weaknesses and strengths; (2) be able to explain the significance of determinism and the free will debate for our understanding of abilities (and vice versa); and (3) be able to explain the relevance of abilities for questions in ethics.

The course will involve weekly lectures in person (not hybrid). The language of instruction is English. Students are expected to read the literature before the lecture. Powerpoint slides will be made available throughout the semester.

Assessment and permitted materials

There will be an in-person written exam. The exam will consist of 8 multiple choice questions and 3 essay questions to be chosen out of a possible 7 questions.

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

The total possible points to be obtained at the exam is 100. The distribution of grades is as follows:

1: 87-100 points
2: 75-86 points
3: 63-74 points
4: 50-62 points
5: 0-49 points

Examination topics

All material covered in lectures and accompanying readings.

Reading list

Preliminary reading list (might still change!):

Beebee, H., Whittle, A., and Svedberg, M, 2020. “Nihil Obstat: Lewis’s Compatibilist Account of Abilities,” The Monist, 103: 245–261.
Clarke, . 2009. “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism,” Mind, 118: 323–351.
Fara, M. 2008. “Masked Abilities and Compatibilism,” Mind, 117: 843–865.
Fischer, J. M. 1999. “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility”. Ethics, 110(1): 93–139.
Frankfurt, H. 1969. ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy, 66/3: 829‐39.
Jaster, R. 2021. The Ability to do Otherwise and the New Dispositionalism. Inquiry, 65: 1149-1166.
Kenny, A. 1975. Will, Freedom, and Power, Oxford: Blackwell. (Selection)
Kratzer, A. 1977. “What ‘Must’ and ‘Can’ Must and Can Mean,” Linguistics and Philosophy, 1: 337–355.
Lehrer, K. 1968. “Cans without Ifs,” Analysis, 29: 29–32.
Lewis, D. 2020. “Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability,” The Monist, 103: 241–24.
Moore, G. E. 1912. Ethics. London: Humphrey Milford; OUP. (Selection)
Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson (Selection)
Stanley, J. and T. Williamson. 2001. “Knowing How,” The Journal of Philosophy, 97: 411–444.
Steward, H. 2020. “Agency as a Two-Way Power: A Defence,” The Monist, 103: 342–355.
van Inwagen, P. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Selection)
Vetter, B. 2013. ‘Can’ without Possible Worlds: Semantics for Anti-Humeans. Philosopher’s Imprint, 13(16): 1-27.
Vetter, B. 2017. Are abilities dispositions? Synthese, 196(1): 201-220.
Vihvelin, K. 2004. ‘Free will demystified: A dispositional account’, Philosophical Topics, 32/1: 427–450.
Whittle, A. 2010. “Dispositional Abilities,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 10(12): 1-23.

Association in the course directory

Last modified: We 28.08.2024 17:26