Universität Wien
Warning! The directory is not yet complete and will be amended until the beginning of the term.

180662 SE Epistemic Agency (2010S)

6.00 ECTS (2.00 SWS), SPL 18 - Philosophie
Continuous assessment of course work

All course materials to be found at:

http://velimitova.weebly.com/students-2010.html

Registration/Deregistration

Note: The time of your registration within the registration period has no effect on the allocation of places (no first come, first served).

Details

max. 45 participants
Language: English

Lecturers

Classes (iCal) - next class is marked with N

  • Wednesday 03.03. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 10.03. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 17.03. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 24.03. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 14.04. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 21.04. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 28.04. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 05.05. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 12.05. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 19.05. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 26.05. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 02.06. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 09.06. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 16.06. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 23.06. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock
  • Wednesday 30.06. 15:00 - 17:00 Seminarraum 3A NIG 3.Stock

Information

Aims, contents and method of the course

We are agents in the world - unlike plants, animals and infants, we form intentions, act on them and are held responsible for our actions. But we would not have intentions and would not act unless we had beliefs. I would not apologise to you if I didn't believe that I had hurt you. You would not jump in the water to save the drowning child if you didn't believe that she was drowning. Are we then responsible for the way in which we form our beliefs? Do we have obligations and duties to form them in some way (say, by following the evidence) rather than another (say, by throwing a coin and letting the outcome dictate what we believe)? Are there such things as epistemic virtues and vices - i.e., some character traits which make us good believers (such as open-mindedness, say) and other character traits which make us vicious believers (such as the habit of jumping to conclusions, say)? Analytic epistemologists have recently become increasingly concerned with these questions. Answering them means developing a theory of epistemic agency. This is the theory we will be developing in this course. The course is divided in three parts. In Part 1 we think about whether we can be held responsible for our beliefs. In Parts 2 and 3 we consider two ways of understanding the idea of epistemic virtues and vices.

Assessment and permitted materials

Regular attendance, one presentation, active participation in discussions, two 10-page essays on pre-set topics.

Minimum requirements and assessment criteria

To develop a detailed critical understanding of the central questions of the debate and too establish fruitful connections amongst these questions.

Examination topics

Each session starts with a lecture and is followed by a discussion of the reading for that session. Having read the prescribed paper is therefore essential. But since this debate is emergent and we will need to do construction work together, knowledge of the secondary literature will be also needed.

Reading list

SECONDARY READINGS

Baehr, J., 2008, 'Four Varieties of Character-based Virtue Epistemology' The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 45, 469-502. link: http://myweb.lmu.edu/jbaehr/Four%20Varieties.doc

Church, Jennifer (2002) 'Taking it to heart: What choice do we have?' The Monist, 85: 3.

Clifford, W. K. (1879) 'The Ethics of Belief' Lectures and Essays by W. K. Clifford, edited by Lesley Stephen & Frederick Pollock (London: Macmillan).

Code, Lorraine (1987) Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover: UP of New England).
DePaul, M. & Zagzebski, L. (eds) (2002) Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and
Epistemology (Oxford University Press).

Fairweather, Abrol & Zagzebski, Linda (eds) (2001) Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press).

Greco, John (2002) 'Virtues in Epistemology' The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul Moser (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Hieronymi, Pamela (2008) 'Responsibility for believing' Synthese 161.

Kvanvig, Jonathan (2010) 'Sosa on Virtue Epistemology' Critica, forthcoming. http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Jonathan_Kvanvig/www/pdf/Sosa.pdf

Montmarquet, James (1993) Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield).

Owens, David (2000) Reason without Freedom: The problem of epistemic normativity (London: Routledge).

Pritchard, D. and M. S. Brady (eds) (2006) Epistemic Virtue and Virtue Epistemology, special issue of Philosophical Studies 130.

Pritchard, D. and M. S. Brady (eds) (2003)Virtues: Moral and Epistemic, special double issue of Metaphilosophy 34, 2003.

Zagzebski, Linda (1996) Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: CUP).

Association in the course directory

MA M 2, § 4.1.4 und § 4.1.3

Last modified: Mo 07.09.2020 15:36